

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 019749
ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO OCT-02 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-12
NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00
NSC-05 /070 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/NE:DCGOODMAN/REWOODS:LP
APPROVED BY EUR:RDVINE

-----000752 251453Z /43

R 250244Z JAN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO
SECDEF
USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 019749

MILITARY ADDEES ALSO FOR POLADS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: MARR, MPOL, SW, NO, DA, FI, IC, NATO, MO

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SWEDISH MILITARY PLANNING GROUP ON
NORTHERN FLANK SECURITY

REF.: STOCKHOLM 121

1. SUMMARY: SWEDISH MILITARY PLANNERS AND DEPARTMENT
OFFICERS MET FOR TWO HOURS JANUARY 17, FOR A TOUR D'HORIZON
ON NORTHERN SECURITY ISSUES. ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 019749

VINE, CHAIRING US SIDE, OUTLINED REASONS FOR INCREASING US
ATTENTION TO NORDIC AREA, AND UNDERLINED IMPORTANCE OF
STRONG SWEDISH DEFENSE POSTURE TO US AND EUROPEAN SECURITY.
DR. KATARINA BRODIN, SWEDISH NATIONAL DEFENSE INSTITUTE,
NOTED THE VIRTUAL IDENTITY OF US AND SWEDISH ASSESSMENTS ON
NORDIC SECURITY QUESTIONS, INCLUDING ON INCREASED SOVIET
INTEREST IN AND PRESSURE ON NORTHERN EUROPE. END SUMMARY.

2. VINE SAID WE HAD BEEN PAYING MORE ATTENTION TO MILITARY SECURITY ISSUES IN NORTHERN EUROPE IN RECENT YEARS, IN LARGE PART BECAUSE OF NORWEGIAN/USSR PROBLEMS LIKE SVALBARD, THE OFFSHORE BOUNDARY DISPUTE, AND UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS ON THE MANAGEMENT OF HYDROCARBON AND FISHERY RESOURCES. THESE PROBLEMS WERE TIED TO LARGER SECURITY CONCERNS AND WERE OF COURSE RELATED TO THE QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF

SOVIET NAVAL FORCES ON THE KOLA PENINSULA. NORWAY ITSELF WAS MORE CONSCIOUS OF ITS SECURITY, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUED STRAINS IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF ITS OIL DISCOVERIES. WE AND OTHER NATO ALLIES HAD BEEN SENSITIZED BY THE RECENT CUBA WAR WHICH HIGHLIGHTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GREENLAND-ICELAND-UK GAP AND OF THE US MANNED NATO FACILITY AT KEFLAVIK.

3. VINE CONTINUED BY CITING SEVERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE NORDIC AREA. HE REFERRED TO FINNISH CRITICISM OF NORWEGIAN NATO EXERCISES, AT A NORDIC COUNCIL MEETING ONE YEAR AGO, AND SUGGESTED THAT THIS REFLECTED FINNISH PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS. HE ALSO NOTED THE DECREASE IN SWEDISH DEFENSE EXPENDITURES OVER THE PAST DECADE, RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTIES SWEDEN FACED IN AN ERA OF

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 019749

INCREASINGLY COMPLEX AND EXPENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS, BUT UNDERLINED THE CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF A STRONG SWEDISH MILITARY DETERRENT TO NORDIC, NATO AND US SECURITY. ANOTHER INTERESTING DEVELOPMENT WAS FINLAND'S DECISION TO STRENGTHEN ITS MILITARY FORCE POSTURE IN THE NORTH.

4. WITH REGARD TO NATO, VINE SAID THE ALLIANCE HAD BEEN INCREASINGLY ATTENTIVE TO THE NORTHERN FLANK OVER THE PAST FIVE TO TEN YEARS. MORE MANEUVERS WERE BEING STAGED, AND SPECIFIC NATO FORCES HAD NOW BEEN EARMARKED TO REINFORCE NORWAY AND DENMARK. THE LAST THING WE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF NATO WANTED, HOWEVER, WAS TO INTRODUCE DESTABILIZING ELEMENTS. WE BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIETS SHARED THIS VIEW. BOTH WE AND THE USSR TENDED TO MOVE VERY SLOWLY ON CHANGES IN NORDIC AREA, BUT THERE WERE INDICATIONS IN SOVIET PRESSURE ON NORWAY AND IN KOSYGIN'S PERFORMANCE IN HELSINKI, THAT THE SOVIETS WERE SEEKING A NEW AND PRIVILEGED RELATIONSHIP.

5. VINE SAID THAT WE BELIEVED THE SOVIET NAVAL FORCES IN THE KOLA WERE TARGETTED PRIMARILY AGAINST THE US, AND NOT SCANDINAVIA. BY THE SAME TOKEN, IN THE EVENT OF A LARGE

SCALE CONFLICT, WE WERE REASONABLY CERTAIN THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD MOVE QUICKLY TO TAKE SVALBARD AND PORTIONS OF NORTHERN NORWAY. THIS WOULD GUARD THEIR ACCESS ROUTES THROUGH THE BARENTS SEA TO THE NORTHERN ATLANTIC, AND PROVIDE FORWARD BASING FOR AIRCRAFT PROVIDING COVER TO NAVAL UNITS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC. WE THOUGHT FINNISH TERRITORY WOULD BE INVOLVED, AND SWEDISH TERRITORY COULD BE, IN ANY 6. DR. BRODIN REPLIED FOR THE SWEDISH SIDE, COMMENTING ON THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN US AND SWEDISH ASSESSMENTS. STABILITY AND LOW TENSIONS HAD TRADITIONALLY CHARACTERIZED THE NORDIC AREA. SHE AGREED THAT SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES IN THE NORTH WERE NOT TARGETED ON SCANDINAVIA, WHICH THE SOVIETS SAW AS A BUFFER TO PROTECT THE KOLA PENINSULA. WHAT HAPPENED IN THE NORTH DEPENDED ON DEVELOPMENTS ON THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 019749

CENTRAL FRONT AND PARTICULARLY GERMANY. THE POLITICAL PRESSURE POINT IN THE NORDIC AREA HAD SHIFTED; THE PAST TOUCHSTONE HAD BEEN FENNO/SOVIET RELATIONS, NOW IT WAS INCREASINGLY SOVIET PRESSURE ON NORWAY. THE SOVIETS BELIEVED THAT THEY HAD A PRIVILEGED POSITION IN NORTHERN EUROPE, AND WERE BECOMING MORE ACTIVE IN EXERTING IT, AS IN KOSYGIN'S LECTURE TO NORDIC PRIME MINISTERS LAST MONTH IN HELSINKI. ALL THIS WAS HAVING AN AFFECT ON INTER-NORDIC RELATIONS, WHERE TENSIONS WERE GROWING. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE BETWEEN NORWAY AND FINLAND OVER THE QUESTION OF FRG TROOP PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY MANEUVERS ON NORWEGIAN TERRITORY.

7. ON DEFENSE POSTURE, SWEDISH AIR FORCE COLONEL LARS BERTIL PERSSON COMMENTED THAT THE DECREASE IN DEFENSE SPENDING HAD MEANT A QUANTITATIVE DECLINE IN SWEDISH DEFENSE FORCES, BUT THAT THIS HAD BEEN OFFSET BY QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS. HE THOUGHT THAT A POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR WOULD STILL HAVE TO PAY MORE THAN IT COULD GAIN BY ATTACKING SWEDEN. HOWEVER, BY 1982 (THE BEGINNING OF NEXT FIVE YEAR DEFENSE PLAN), THE ALTERNATIVES WOULD BE SPENDING MORE OR TAKING GREATER RISKS. THE BULK OF SWEDISH DEFENSE FORCES WERE LOCATED IN SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL SWEDEN, THUS IN THE AREAS OF POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM VINE, PERSSON SAID SWEDEN FOUND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS COULD SUCCESSFULLY ATTACK THE WESTERN NATIONS ON THE APPROACHES TO THE BALTIC IN VIEW OF NATO FORCES THERE. HE AGREED, HOWEVER, TO THE LOGIC OF THE SOVIETS TRYING TO TAKE SVALBARD AND NORTHERN NORWAY EARLY IN ANY GENERAL WAR. HE BELIEVED THE SOVIETS WOULD WANT TO TAKE NORWAY DOWN TO NARVIK, AND THAT ANY LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE NORWEGIANS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY INVOLVE PORTIONS OF FINLAND AND SWEDEN. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 019749

8. REPLYING TO A QUESTION FROM PERSSON, VINE SAID WE SERIOUSLY DOUBTED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD LAUNCH AN ATTACK ON NORWAY FOR TERRITORY ALONE. IN THE ABSENCE OF A MORE GENERAL CONFLICT, THE PAYOFF WOULD NOT EQUAL THE RISKS OF ATTACKING A MEMBER OF NATO AND THUS DRAWING A REACTION FROM THE ALLIANCE. ON WHAT WE WERE DOING IN RESPONSE TO GROWING SOVIET PRESSURE ON NORWAY, VINE REITERATED A MAJOR GOAL WAS AVOIDING THE INTRODUCTION OF DESTABILIZING INFLUENCES. WE

MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE CONSIDER NORWAY TO BE THE SOVEREIGN POWER ON SVALBARD, AND ENCOURAGE NORWAY TO EXERCISE ITS ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY UNDER THE SPITZBERGEN TREATY. HE SAID WE HOPED NORWAY WOULD ACT AS THE GUARANTOR OF THE RIGHTS OF ALL SIGNATORIES TO THE TREATY. THOUGH NORWAY MUST DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE SOVIETS ON THIS AND OTHER NORTHERN ISSUES, IT IS WELL AWARE THAT IT DOES SO AS A MEMBER OF NATO AND WITH ALLIED SUPPORT. ON THE QUESTION OF JURIDICION OVER THE SVALBARD SHELF, VINE SAID THE US HAD RESERVED ITS POSITION, WHILE URGING NORWAY TO DEVELOP REGIMES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SHELF RESOURCES WHICH WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ECONOMIC AND SECURITY CONCERNS OF ALL INTERESTED PARTIES, INCLUDING US AND THE SOVIETS.

9. FOR OSLO: YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO BRIEF SELECTED SENIOR GON OFFICIALS AT YOUR DISCRETION ON ABOVE US/SWEDISH DEFENSE DISCUSSIONS. VANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NATIONAL SECURITY, PLANNING MEETINGS, MILITARY PLANS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 25 jan 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE019749
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: DCGOODMAN/REWOODS:LP
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780037-0429
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780123/aaaaatlu.tel
Line Count: 202
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: de5509e0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 STOCKHOLM 121
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3715730
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MEETING WITH SWEDISH MILITARY PLANNING GROUP ON NORTHERN FLANK SECURITY
TAGS: MARR, MPOL, SW, NO, DA, FI, IC, MO, NATO
To: STOCKHOLM
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/de5509e0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014